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Economics, Politics, and the Reading of
Statutes and the Constitution
Richard A. Posnert
Economists have in recent years begun to study the causes and
effects of legislation, and the elements of a positive economic theory of legislation are now in place.' Such a theory would appear to
have implications for how judges do, and perhaps for how they
should, interpret legislative provisions, both statutory and constitutional. But to date these implications have not been explored
t Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, University of Chicago Law School. The research assistance of Edward Wahl is gratefully acknowledged, as are the helpful comments of David Currie, Frank Easterbrook, Gerald Gunther, Frank Michelman, George Stigler, and Cass Sunstein on a previous draft. This article
was conceived and largely written during the lengthy gestation of my appointment to the
Seventh Circuit-a period in which the issues discussed in the article assumed a greater
than merely academic significance to me. I hasten to add, however, that the views expressed
are wholly personal and in no way official.
1 The seminal paper, breaking with the older, predominantly normative tradition, is
Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGwr. Sci. 3 (1971). For
efforts at systematization of Stigler's insights, see Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & EcoN. 211 (1976), and G. Becker, A Theory of Political Behavior (Sept. 1981) (Working Paper No. 006-1, Center for the Study of the Economy and the
State, University of Chicago) (extensive and up-to-date bibliography); for review essays, see
Jordan, ProducerProtection,PriorMarket Structure and the Effects of Government Regulation, 15 J.L. & ECON. 151 (1972), and Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 B.LL J.
EcoN. & MGMT. Sci. 335 (1974).
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systematically. There are only brief discussions in the literature on
the economic analysis of law,2 and none, as far as I know, in the
traditional legal literature on statutory and constitutional interpretation.3 This article is a start toward filling the gap. The attempt
should be of interest not only to students of the economic analysis
of law, as well as to theorists and practitioners of statutory construction, but also to economists of the political process. That the
economist takes statutes to be complete when enacted is striking
to a lawyer, who realizes that the meaning of a statute is not fixed
until the courts have interpreted the statute. Judicial interpretation of statutes is thus an intrinsic part of a complete economic
theory of legislation, though whether an important part remains to
be seen.
It is easy to see how a new view of legislation might require
changes, perhaps radical ones, in how courts interpret legislation.
It is more difficult to see how the new view might explain what the
courts have been doing all along-but my greater interest is in this,
the positive question. I believe that the apparent discordance between an economic view of legislation, which emphasizes the efforts of interest groups to redistribute wealth in their favor, and a
traditional legal view, which requires the court to divine and effectuate the public interest goal of legislation, is not real; that courts
have generally been realistic about legislation; and that the legal
tradition in interpreting statutes becomes more, rather than less,
intelligible when an economic view of legislation is adopted.
I.

THE

ECONOMIC

APPROACH TO LEGISLATION

There is now an extensive economic literature on the determi2 See R. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 408-15, 495-96 (2d ed. 1977); Landes &

Posner, The Independent Judiciaryin an Interest-GroupPerspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875
(1975).
3 The lawyers' neglect of the economic theory of legislation is a bit surprising, because
though many lawyers find economic concepts alien and repulsive, the most distinctive element in this particular theory-the emphasis placed on the procurement of protective legislation by interest groups-has been a part of the political science literature at least since the
discussion of "factions" in THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison). See also A. BENTLEY, THE
PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT (1908); D. TRuMAN, TaE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1951). In fairness, however, I should point out that Professor Gerald Gunther's proposal for more stringent constitutional review of state economic legislation, see infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text, reflects an awareness of the role of interest groups in procuring legislation. See
also infra note 63. The lawyers' literature on how to read a statute is well represented by H.
HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1144-1417 (tent. ed. 1958), and F. FRANKFURTER,
Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, in OF LAw AND MEN 44 (P. Elnan ed. 1956).
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nants of legislation. At least three major theories can be discerned
in the literature, though they can, I shall argue, be treated as elements of a single theory.
A. Public Interest Theory
The "public interest" theory, which is the oldest of the three,
is well represented in the writings of such economists as Baumol4
and Pigou.5 It conceives both the ideal and the actual function of
legislation to be to increase economic welfare by correcting market
failures such as crime and pollution. Some laws designed to transfer wealth from rich to poor also can be fitted into the theory.
Free-rider problems might thwart private efforts to bring about the
level of transfers from rich to poor that the rich would prefer; to
that extent public wealth redistribution is a public good no different in kind from protection against crime or pollution.
There is little, if any, tension between the economist's public
interest theory and the traditional lawyer's view of legislation.6
The lawyer's view is also that legislation is designed to protect the
public interest, implicitly defined in utilitarian terms. If this were
the only economic theory of legislation, this article would not be
worth writing.
B. Interest Group Theory
The "interest group" theory asserts that legislation is a good
demanded and supplied much as other goods, so that legislative
protection flows to those groups that derive the greatest value from
it, regardless of overall social welfare, whether "welfare" is defined
as wealth, utility, or some other version of equity or justice.7 An
4 E.g., W. BAUMOL, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND THE THEORY OF THE STATE (2d ed. 1965).
5 A. PIOou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1932).
6 The traditional view is soon to celebrate its four-hundredth anniversary. See Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (Ex. 1584), where the court said that the essential steps in
interpreting a statute are to ascertain "[wihat was the mischief and defect for which the
common law did not provide," "[w]hat remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed
to cure the disease of the Commonwealth," and "[t]he true reason of the remedy; and then
the office of all the Judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy." But not every statute that a court is called upon to interpret is intended to correct a mischief; the intent may have been simply to redistribute
wealth from a less to a more powerful segment of the community. For a modern statement
of the theory of legislation implicit in Heydon's Case, see H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 3,
at 1410-17.
7 See, e.g., J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); A. DowNs,
AN EcoNoMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957); W. RIKER, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL COALI-
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important determinant of the net benefit of legislative protection
to a group, and the primary focus of this literature, is the cost of
organizing effective political action. That cost increases as group
membership becomes larger and the group less cohesive. The size
of the group also bears on the benefits of legislative protection. As
the group becomes larger, the benefits to each member are likely to
become smaller, and hence the individual's incentive to contribute
to the group's endeavor will be weakened. Should the group try to
overcome this problem by seeking so large a redistribution that all
members would benefit substantially, the redistribution will be
much more costly to those outside the group who will be taxed to
defray its cost, and this will increase resistance to the group's objective. From an analysis of such factors, the literature concludes
that effective interest groups are usually small and directed toward
a single issue. The benefits of a redistribution in their favor are
concentrated, the costs of organizing the group are small, and the
costs of the redistribution are so widely diffused that nobody has
much incentive to oppose it.
The properties that make legislative redistributions feasible
have nothing to do with the public interest, whether defined in efficiency or equity terms. If anything, they tend to make legislation
systematically perverse from a public interest standpoint by fostering the redistribution of wealth from large groups, including the
public as a whole, to small ones. From a normative standpoint,
therefore, the interest group theory is pessimistic concerning the
purpose and effects of legislation, while the public interest theory
is optimistic. It is not surprising that the public interest theory
flourished in the period when most people favored an expansion of
government action, and the interest group theory in the period of
disillusionment with big government that began in the 1970's.
The interest group theory, incidentally, has had some distinguished judicial adherents-suggesting that judges may be more
realistic about legislation than legal scholars. Holmes said in an
early essay:
The struggle for life, undoubtedly, is constantly putting the
interests of men at variance with those of the lower animals.
And the struggle does not stop in the ascending scale with the
monkeys, but is equally the law of human existence. Outside
of legislation this is undeniable. It is mitigated by sympathy,

TIONS

3-31 (1962); G.

STIGLER, THE CrrIzEN AND THE STATE (1975).
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prudence, and all the social and moral qualities. But in the
last resort a man rightly prefers his own interest to that of his
neighbors. And this is as true in legislation as in any other
form of corporate action. All that can be expected from modern improvements is that legislation should easily and quickly,
yet not too quickly, modify itself in accordance with the will
of the de facto supreme power in the community, and that the
spread of an educated sympathy should reduce the sacrifice of
minorities to a minimum. But whatever body may possess the
supreme power for the moment is certain to have interests inconsistent with others which have competed unsuccessfully.
The more powerful interests must be more or less reflected in
legislation; which, like every other device of man or beast,
must tend in the long run to aid the survival of the
fittest. . . . [I]t is no sufficient condemnation of legislation
that it favors one class at the expense of another; for much or
all legislation does that ....
The fact is that legislation...
is necessarily made a means by which a body, having the
power, put burdens which are disagreeable to them on the
shoulders of somebody else.'
Holmes's belief in social Darwinism, evident from the quoted passage, makes him an ancestor of the modern economic theory of legislation as the outcome of a struggle between interest groups. The
affinity between economic theory and the theory of biological
evolution has often been remarked;" social Darwinism, applied to
the legislative process, connects them.
Justice Black's opinion for the Court in Eastern Railroad
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.10 is another
noteworthy example of judicial realism about statutes. The Court
in that case held that the Sherman Act1 does not prevent collective action to obtain legislation that would hurt competitors. 2
8 O.W. HOLMES, Herbert Spencer: Legislation and Empiricism, in JUSTICE OLiVER
WENDELL HOLMES: His BOOK NOTICES AND UNCOLLECTED LETTRS AND PAPERS 104, 107-09
(H. Shriver ed. 1936). Although the essay was written before Holmes became a judge, it
describes accurately the attitude that he brought as a judge to the task of determining the
constitutionality of legislation.
I For a systematic treatment, see Becker, Altruism, Egoism, and Genetic Fitness: Economics and Sociobiology, 14 J. ECON. Lrr. 817 (1976).
10 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
21 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
12 365 U.S. at 136. The defendants in that case had engaged a public relations firm to
conduct a publicity campaign designed to foster the adoption and retention of laws harmful
to the trucking business.
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Black, whose realism about legislation was rooted not in theory,
but in his experience as a United States Senator, stated for the
Court:
The right of the people to inform their representatives in government of their desires with respect to the passage or enforcement of laws cannot properly be made to depend upon
their intent in doing so. It is neither unusual nor illegal for
people to seek action on laws in the hope that they may bring
about an advantage to themselves and a disadvantage to their
competitors. 3
By the Court's holding, he said, "we have restored what appears to
be the true nature of the case-a 'no-holds-barred fight' between
two industries both of which are seeking control of a profitable
source of income."" In another case,' 5 Black rejected the concept

of "rationality review"-a rejection clearly implied, as we shall see
below, by the interest group approach."'
C. Legislative Process Theory
The public interest and interest group theories are theories
about the content of legislation, the former predicting that it will
be efficient (always bearing in mind that efficiency may require
some public redistribution of wealth), the latter that it will be
amorally redistributive. Some economists, however, have focused
on the legislative process itself rather than on the content of the
legislation that results.17 They have sought to explain, for example,
why different sized majorities are required for different types of
legislation, why legislatures are frequently bicameral, why there is
increasing delegation of legislative authority to administrative
13 Id. at 139.
14 Id. at 144 (footnote omitted).
15
IS

Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731-32 (1963).
See infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text. Examples of judicial realism in rela-

tion to statutes could be multiplied, but I will give just one more, from Learned Hand. In
discussing statutes that made an employer liable to any employee injured as a result of the
employer's failure to take the precautions specified in the statutes, Hand stated: "Such stat-

utes are partial; they upset the freedom of contract, and for ulterior purposes put the two
contesting sides at unequal advantage; they should be construed, not as theorems of Euclid,
but with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them." Lehigh Valley Coal Co.
v. Yensavage, 218 F. 547, 553 (2d Cir. 1914).
17 The seminal works are J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 7; A. DowNs, supra
note 7.
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agencies, and what effects such delegation is likely to have.18
D. A Four-Fold Typology
There is no incompatibility between either the public interest
or interest group theory, on the one hand, and the various theories
of legislative process, on the other. Less obviously, there is no necessary incompatibility between the public interest and interest
group theories. The public interest theory is mainly concerned
with identifying market failures that could, in principle, be rectified by legislation, and its proponents would hardly be willing to
shoulder the burden of establishing what proportion of legislation
actually enacted is of this character. The interest group theory
does not deny the possibility that a large group-perhaps the
whole society-occasionally might procure legislation on its own
behalf. If the benefits to the individual members of a large group
are great enough and the costs to nonmembers small enough (there
may be few or even no nonmembers), the legislation will be enacted. There will be free-rider problems, but they need not be insurmountable under the postulated conditions. Laws against murder illustrate this point.
I conclude that the public interest and interest group theories
are, at least in some mixture, complementary rather than antagonistic. It should be possible, therefore, to classify statutes between
those that advance the public interest and those that advance instead the interest of some (narrow) interest group. A number of
statutes clearly belong in one group or another-the basic criminal
laws, the original antitrust law,19 and the provision of a court system, in the public interest category; the tobacco subsidy, the Interstate Commerce Act,20 and the regulation of taxicabs, 21 in the interest group category.
But these are just polar cases. There are many intermediate
,s On voting majorities, see A. DowNs, supra note 7, at 51-74. On bicameralism, see J.
BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 7, at 233-48. On delegation, see Ehrlich & Posner, An
Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 279-80 (1974).
19 Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§
1-7 (1976)).
2 Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (current version in scattered
sections of 49 U.S.C. (1976)); see Hilton, The Consistency of the Interstate Commerce Act,
9 J.L. & EcoN. 87 (1966).
11 See, e.g., ILL. RE V. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-42-6 (1979) (authorizing municipalities to Hcense taxicabs); Kitch, Isaacson & Kasper, The Regulation of Taxicabs in Chicago, 14 J.L.
& EcoN. 285 (1971); cf. R. PosNER, supra note 2, at 267-68 (economic argument that public
utility regulations are "interest group" statutes).
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cases, and to fit these into the eclectic theory we need a richer categorization than the public interest/interest group dichotomy. I
suggest a four-fold typology, with the economically defined public
interest theory and the narrow interest group theory as categories
at opposite extremes, and two new intermediate categories: a public interest category defined in terms other than economic, and a
"public sentiment" category. 2
1. Public Interest, Economically Defined. This category is
limited to legislation that corrects market failures such as crime
and pollution, though as mentioned earlier certain redistributions
could be included because they correct failures in the market for
charitable giving.23 Important examples of laws that serve the public interest economically defined are the provisions of the Constitution that establish the separation of powers and freedom of political speech and thereby protect society against a particularly costly
form of monopoly-a monopoly of political power.
2. Public Interest in Other Senses. Whatever one's own conception of the public interest may be, it seems inappropriate to
dismiss a priori any other conception that is widely shared. For
example, if the progressive income tax can be justified in terms of
benefits received, it is in category (1) above; but even if it cannot
be justified in those terms, it would still be public interest legislation if justifiable in terms of some widely held concept of the just
distribution of wealth. This example also illustrates the equivocal
nature of my classification. Many economists regard the progressive income tax either as a means of maximizing utility2 *-which,
depending on one's precise view of the meaning of "economic efficiency,'' 5 could be part of either category (1) or category (2)-or

alternatively as a means of soaking the rich 2 6 -which would put it
2 This typology of legislation (broadly defined to include the Constitution) ignores the

question of effectiveness, an issue that still dominates the economic analysis of legislation. A
fascinating literature, beginning with Stigler & Friedland, What Can Regulators Regulate?
The Case of Electricity, 5 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1962), has questioned the effectiveness of a vari-

ety of statutes, especially those relating to securities, health, and safety. See, e.g., Peltzman,
An Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation: The 1962 Drug Amendments, 81 J.
POL. ECON. 1049 (1973); Sands, How Effective is Safety Legislation?, 11 J.L. & ECON. 165

(1968). The finding of these studies that statutes frequently miscarry is strictly empirical
and does not explain why ineffectual legislation is enacted. The issue is therefore tangential
to this article, which focuses on the determinants of legislation, but it does have some relevance to my analysis. See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
2 See supra p. 265.
24 See, e.g., A. LERNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTROL 228-40 (1944).
25 See R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 48-87 (1981).
26 See, e.g., M. FRIEDMAN, CArrALISM AND FREEDOM 161-76 (1962); F. HAYEK, THE CON-
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into category (4) below (interest group legislation).
3. Public Sentiment. Much legislation cannot be justified or
explained on economic grounds, but perhaps only because not
enough is known about the relevant costs and benefits. Legislation
forbidding the sale of pornography is an example. Such legislation
seems at first glance to be an interference with freedom of contract
that reduces efficiency, just as a usury law does. But despite the
loose use of the term "special interests" in recent political discussion to describe people who feel strongly about an issue, the supporters of laws against pornography do not have the characteristics
that make for an effective interest group. And the possible external
effects of pornography (on the crime rate, relations within the family, even perhaps population) may, though they have never been
quantified, justify the laws and explain the intense hostility that
many people feel toward pornography.
Laws based on public sentiment rather than on either an objective weighing of demonstrable pros and cons or on cartel-like
pressures for redistributing wealth resemble public interest legislation in that their support seems both broadly based and not motivated by narrow self-interest. But they cannot readily be defended
on economic grounds given our existing and deficient knowledge of
their effects. They have largely been ignored by economists but
their importance in the legislative output requires that they not be
ignored in this article.
4. Narrow Interest Group Legislation.Most recent economic
analyses of legislation have focused on statutes that appear to promote the narrow self-interest of a particular industry or a group of
firms within an industry. Yet what has occurred is less a change
than a sharpening of focus, for the change in professional opinion
about the economic nature of legislation has resulted largely from
7
a reevaluation of statutes, such as the Interstate Commerce Act
and the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938,25 that were once regarded as
legitimate responses to deficiencies or excesses of competition. The
interest group theorists have had their greatest success, as one
would expect, in explaining legislation applicable to a particular
industry, such as the laws regulating the various transportation

STITUTION op LIBERTY

306-23 (1960).

'7 Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (current version in scattered
sections of 49 U.S.C. (1976)).
28 Ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 (current version at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1976 & Supp. I
1979)).
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and utility industries, occupational licensure laws, and industryspecific tax and subsidy schemes. They have been less successful in
explaining economy-wide legislation such as the antitrust laws and
health and safety regulations. Some of these laws may, of course,
be public interest laws; others may not be. In any event, the
boundary between narrow interest group legislation and public interest legislation is indistinct.
II.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATION FOR
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

A.

Motive vs. Intent

I begin with a principle that may seem to belong to constitutional rather than to statutory interpretation: in reviewing a statute, courts are to look to the intent but not to the motive of the
enacting legislature. This principle is usually invoked in constitutional cases, where the issue is whether a statute should be invalidated because of the motive behind its enactment. 29 But it also
defines the scope of judicial inquiry into the meaning of a statute
in cases where the statute is assumed to be valid and only its application is in dispute. Courts look to the language of the statute,
to the legislative history,3 0 and to other evidence of legislative intent, but they do not speculate on the motives of the legislators in

enacting the statute.3 1 They do not, in short, conduct the kind of
economic or political science inquiry that might reveal the pattern
of interest group pressures behind the statute.
This limitation is of extraordinary interest given the theme of
this article. At first glance it may seem diametrically opposed to a

realistic view of the political process and may seem to place the
judiciary in opposition to the legislative will, even when there is no
issue of constitutionality. In fact it is merely inevitable. Courts do
not have the research tools that they would need to discover the
motives behind legislation. Nor can they just presume the presence
of an interest group somewhere behind the scenes. Many statutes
29 The usual answer is "no." See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25
(1971). The extensive scholarly literature on this issue is well represented by Brest, Palmer

v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of UnconstitutionalLegislative Motive, 1971
Sup. CT. REv. 95; Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in ConstitutionalLaw, 79
YALE L.J. 1205 (1970); and Legislative Motivation, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 925 (1978).
30 For possible limitations, see infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
31 See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-85 (1968); McCray v. United
States, 195 U.S. 27, 56 (1904); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 130 (1810).
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really are enacted in the public interest; in those statutes, the actual and the ostensible purposes coincide. Moreover, even where it
is obvious that a particular statute was procured by some particular interest group-the National Labor Relations Act 2 by the labor movement, for example-it will not be clear, at least without
an inquiry that is beyond the judicial competence to undertake,
how completely the group prevailed upon Congress to do its will.
The statute as ultimately enacted may represent a compromise
with other groups; if so, the "real" legislative purpose may be
unclear.
Therefore, if the legislature wants to indicate the lines of political pressure along which the law should be interpreted, it has to
say so explicitly, either in the statute or in the legislative history
materials to which courts have ready access. No matter how faithfully judges wish to carry out the will of Congress, they are limited
to public materials in divining that will.
This limitation on judicial capacity imposes a further limitation on the operation of interest group politics that is wholly distinct from the limitations that the Constitution may or may not
place on that operation. To the extent that legislators use Aesopian
language to deceive potential opponents of the interest groups behind legislation, they may fool the courts as well and thereby limit
the political power of those interest groups.
This limitation can be reconciled with a normative theory of
democratic politics along the following lines. The theory assumes
an informed electorate. Although interest groups can take advantage of the limited incentives that voters have to inform themselves concerning public issues, the interposition of a judiciary
that, in interpreting legislation, is limited to public materials offsets to some extent the distortions that voter ignorance introduces
into the operation of a democratic political system. This is not an
argument for free-wheeling statutory interpretation. The point is
simply that, however conscientiously the judge tries to follow the
legislature's will, he will be limited to the statutory text and to
other public materials; he will not ask which interest group got
how much of what it wanted from the legislature.

32 Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp.
HI 1979)).
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Reasoning from One Statute to Another

In piecing out the meaning of a statute, courts do not use the
intent behind one statute to illuminate the intent behind another;
that is, they do not treat statutes in the same way that a common
law court treats prior cases-as precedents whose reasoning may
illuminate the issues in a case.3 3 This seeming myopia has been
criticized,3 4 but makes good sense once a realistic view of the legislative process is taken. If some statutes-and the courts will have
trouble knowing which ones-reflect the pressures of narrow interest groups rather than any coherent view of the public interest, it
is perilous for courts to use one statute to illuminate the meaning
of another. There is no assurance that the particular constellation
of political pressures that produced the first statute was also at
play when the second was adopted. And because the first may have
been purely the product of pressure and not of a sincere search for
the public good, the first cannot serve as a dependable reason for
interpreting the second in a particular way.
C.

Legislative History

The approach taken in this artidle casts light on two recurrent
issues in the use of legislative history to interpret statutes. The
first is whether it is proper to use legislative history at all, and if
so, which parts of that history to use.3 5 Because legislators vote on
the statutory language rather than on the legislative history, they
cannot be presumed to have assented to all that has been said,
either in the committee reports or on the floor, about a bill that
becomes law.
This matters, however, only if one holds the unrealistic view
that each enacted bill reflects the convictions of a majority of legislators voting for it. If instead it is assumed that some unknown
fraction of all bills are passed at the behest of politically powerful
interest groups, it is not so clear that each member of the legislative majority behind a particular bill has studied the details of the
3 This rule is subject to a narrow exception for statutes in pari materia. See, e.g.,
Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243-45 (1972); United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S.
60, 64-65 (1940).
34 See Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213 (R.
Pound ed. 1934).
11 For controversy over these questions, compare Radin, Statutory Interpretation,43
HARV. L. Rav. 863 (1930) with Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation:A Peek Into the Mind
and Will of a Legislature, 50 IND. L.J. 206 (1975).
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bill he voted for. It may be more realistic to assume that he assented to the deal struck by the sponsors of the bill. The terms of
the deal presumably are stated accurately in the committee reports
and in the floor comments of the sponsors (otherwise the sponsors
will have difficulty striking deals in the future), though not necessarily by opponents of the bill, who may take the floor or write
minority opinions in committees to create a specious legislative
history that they hope will influence judicial interpretation of the
statute.
This picture is especially persuasive if we assume a considerable amount of "log rolling"-that is, vote trading-in the legislative process. Log rolling implies that legislators often vote without
regard to their personal convictions. This process makes it unrealistic to demand that each legislator assent only to those aspects of
statutory meaning that are fixed in the language of the bill, divorced from the intentions of its sponsors as reflected in their
statements in the committee reports and on the floor.
My analysis is also germane to the question what weight to
give post-enactment expressions of legislative intent. The answer it
suggests, which is also the traditional answer, 8 is that such expressions should be given little or no weight. The deal is struck when
the statute is enacted. If courts paid attention to subsequent expressions of legislative intent not embodied in any statute, they
would be unraveling the deal that had been made; they would be
breaking rather than enforcing the legislative contract. Nor, if one
takes seriously the interest group theory of politics, can subsequent expressions of legislative understanding be treated simply as
impartial interpretations of the law; they are as likely to be a gambit in the practice of interest group politics.
D. Implied Rights of Action
A statute often will provide for criminal or other public remedies for its violation but not say whether private individuals can
bring damage or injunctive actions to enforce it. The present analysis may shed some light on whether a private right of action can
be "implied" in a statute that is silent on private remedies, a ques" See, e.g., Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 758 (1979); United States v.
Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 411 (1962). For a striking exception to the conventional approach, consider the recent practice of the California courts in receiving courtroom testimony on legislative intent from legislators, discussed in Comment, Statutory Interpretationin California:
Individual Testimony as an Extrinsic Aid, 15 U.S.F.L. Rev. 241 (1981).
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tion that has become controversial in recent years.37
The question has an antecedent in the interplay between the
standard of care in negligence cases and criminal safety statutes.
Suppose a legislature passes a statute forbidding people to drive
automobiles faster than fifty-five miles per hour, and someone violates the statute, injuring another as a result. If the victim of the
accident sues the injurer, may violation of the statute be used as
evidence, perhaps conclusive, of the injurer's negligence? The answer could depend on one's theory of legislation. The public interest theory implies that a legislative, pronouncement on safety
should be given great weight: the legislature was honestly trying to
determine an optimal safety standard, and it has tools not available to courts for making such determinations. 8 The interest group
approach implies, to the contrary, that there is no presumption
that a legislative safety standard represents a sincere effort at optimal safety, so courts should give it no more weight in private cases
than the legislature prescribed. Under this view, if there is no evidence that the legislature wanted the standard used in private
cases, courts should not use it. The recurrent finding in the economic literature that legislated safety standards are perverse or ineffectual, quite apart from whether they serve some group's special
interest, reinforces this conclusion.3
The choice between theories of legislation has implications for
four specific issues regarding the use of legislated standards in tort
cases, and for one issue regarding an implied private right of action
to enforce a statute that does not explicitly provide for such a
remedy.
1. Legislative Intent. As already suggested, if the interest
group view is taken the only question for a court asked to use a
37 For analysis, see Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programsand Private Rights, 95 HIAv.
L. REV. 1193 (1982). The Supreme Court has in a short period swung from enthusiasm for
implied rights of action to hostility. For example, compare Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (private cause of action for money
damages available under fourth amendment for warrantless search) and J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (private cause of action available under section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) with Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445
U.S. 136 (1980) (neither Freedom of Information Act, Federal Records Act of 1950, nor
Records Disposal Act confer private right of action) and Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,
442 U.S. 560 (1979) (no private cause of action available under section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
" This seems to be the thrust of Ezra Ripley Thayer's influential analysis of the impact
of statutes on the standard of care in negligence cases. See Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REV. 317, 321-23 (1914).
" See supra note 22.
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statutory standard in a private case is whether the legislature intended to require such use. The issue of legislative intent does not
arise under the public interest view, where the only question is
whether the legislative standard is pertinent to the issues in the
case. The test most often used by tort courts-whether the plaintiff claiming the benefit of the statute was one of the people whom
the legislature was trying to protect 4 0 -seems to come to the same
thing: an inquiry into the relevance of the standard to the case at
hand.
2. Technical Invalidity. Suppose a statute containing a
safety or health standard is enacted but later is invalidated because of some technical defect in the enactment process. Should
the statute nonetheless be given weight by a court in a private action involving the subject matter of the statute? Again the answer
depends on one's theory of the legislative process. The public interest theory implies that the defective statute should be given effect unless the defect raises a doubt whether the statute really reflects the deliberate choice of the legislature; 41 a purely technical
defect does not nullify the information content of the statute.
Under the interest group view of legislation, however, there is no
presumption that a statute has any such content. The courts bow
to the legislative determination only as a matter of power; if the
legislation is defectively enacted, it is not an authentic exercise of
legislative power and therefore should not influence, let alone bind,
the courts.42
3. Federal Standards in State Courts. If a state court is
asked in a private tort action to derive the applicable standard of
care from a federal safety statute, the choice between theories of

40 W.

PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 36, at 192-95 (4th ed. 1971). See,

e.g., Fitzwater v. Sunset Empire, Inc., 263 Or. 276, 502 P.2d 214 (1972) (snow-clearing ordinance creates duty in favor of the municipality only); Akers v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry.,
58 Minn. 540, 60 N.W. 669 (1894) (railroad yard safety statute not designed to protect
trespassers).
41 See Clinkscales v. Carver, 22 Cal. 2d 72, 136 P.2d 777 (1943) (technical invalidity
does not affect applicability of legislative standard); W. PROSSER, supra note 40, § 36, at
191-92.
42 The same result should follow in the courts' use of health or safety standards enacted
by the legislature after the commission of a tortious act. Under the public interest theory,
courts should give the standard effect because it embodies the legislature's judgment of the
proper standard of reasonable care. See Fall v. ESSO Standard Oil Co., 297 F.2d 411 (5th
Cir. 1961) (subsequently enacted statute prohibiting sale or possession of switchblade knives
used to demonstrate that a switchblade knife is a dangerous weapon). Under the interest
group approach, however, the standard reflects legislative power only and should be given
no effect, for that power had not been exercised at the time of the tortious conduct.
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legislation may again be decisive. Courts that adopt the public interest view presumably should use any pertinent federal standards,
because the standards can be assumed to provide information on
whether the defendant was negligent. But under the interest group
approach, courts have no reason to pay any attention to federal
statutes, unless the statutes bind state courts by preempting any
inconsistent state determinations on issues within their scope.
4. Tortious Acts Outside the Legislative Purpose. In Gorris
v. Scott,4 3 the defendant violated a statute that required animals
to be penned on shipboard. The purpose of the statute was to prevent contagion; the plaintiff's animals were washed overboard, although they would not have been had the defendant penned them
as the statute required. The court held that the defendant's violation of the statute did not make him liable. This is the usual result
insuch cases,44 but viewed from a public interest standpoint is difficult to understand. If the defendant violated the statute, he acted
wrongfully, and liability would have the salutary effect of increasing the incentives to observe the statutory command. But if the
statute was just a favor to some interest group, adding sanctions
for its violation via the tort law may upset the deal struck in the
legislature by giving the interest group more than it could obtain
in the political arena.
5. Implying a PrivateRight of Action. In deciding whether a
statute creates a private cause of action for those injured by its
violation, courts frequently ask whether the statute creates an adequate set of public remedies for its violation, so that implied private remedies are not needed to enforce it effectively. If courts find
the statutory remedial scheme so incomplete or defective that private remedies are necessary to make it enforceable, they are more
likely to imply a private remedy. 45 This result is defensible only
under the public interest theory of legislation. The absence of ef-

" 9 L.R.-Ex. 125 (1874).

" See W. PROSSER, supra note 40, § 36, at 195.
"I See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (private right of action implied
under section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Breitwieser v. KMS Indus.,
Inc., 467 F.2d 1391 (5th Cir. 1972) (rejecting private right of action under the Fair Labor
Standards Act), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 969 (1973). The Supreme Court has become hostile to
implying private rights of action and may no longer be willing to do so even if the remedial
scheme is defective. In fact, the Court currently is reluctant to recognize a private right of
action unless Congress indicates that it intended to create one. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co.
v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568-78 (1979) (no private right of action found under section
17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). Under the analysis in this article, this is the
correct approach if the interest group theory of legislation is adopted.
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fective remedies implies to the interest group theorist that the
group that procured the legislation lacked the political muscle to
get an effective statute, and it is not the business of the courts to
give an interest group a benefit that was denied by the legislature.
Under this view, to imply a private right of action is to intervene
in the legislative struggle on the side of one interest group, overriding opposing groups that had managed to thwart the enactment of
an effective statute. The issue is identical to that in Gorris.
The public interest and interest group theories of legislation
have very different implications for the proper use of statutes in
private cases. But as I argued in part I, we are not limited to a
binary choice, and this gives rise to a puzzle: if the output of a
legislature is a mixture of public interest and interest group statutes, together with others (based on "sentiment") that are difficult
to classify into either group, and if, moreover, courts lack the research tools they need to classLfy statutes correctly, what is the
judge to do when asked to rely on a statute in a private case as a
source either of the standard of care or of the underlying right of
action? As a matter of logic, it seems he cannot act at all without
determining whether a statute is motivated by public interest or
interest group considerations-a determination beyond his competence.
Because there is no easy way out of this dilemma, I am led to
predict that courts will act with apparent inconsistency. Casual
empiricism supports this prediction. Not only has the Supreme
Court veered sharply in recent years in its attitude toward implying private rights of action,4 but courts asked to use criminal statutes in tort cases have responded inconsistently. An example will
show this.4 7 By relying on criminal statutes to determine a standard of care without regard to the legislature's intentions regarding
such a use, courts implicitly embrace the public interest theory of
legislation. However, by refusing to use statutes for this purpose in
cases not envisaged by the legislature, as in the Gorris v. Scott line
4' See

supra note 45.
For other examples, see W. PROSSER, supra note 40, § 36, at 194-95. Compare Ross v.
Hartman, 139 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943) (statute requiring motor vehicles to be locked intended to protect against accidents involving car thieves), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 790 (1944)
and Heiting v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 252 Ill. 466, 96 N.E. 842 (1911) (railway fencing
statute intended to protect children) with Kiste v. Red Cab, Inc., 122 Ind. App. 587, 106
N.E.2d 395 (1952) (ignition key statute not intended to protect against car accidents involving the intervening negligence of thieves) and Di Caprio v. New York Cent. R.R., 231 N.Y.
94, 131 N.E. 746 (1921) (railway fencing statute not intended to protect children).
17
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of cases,4 8 courts shrink from a full embrace of the public interest
approach. Judicial uncertainty regarding the use of statutes in private cases is well illustrated by a federal district court decision
holding both that (1) the sternness of the remedies prescribed for
49
violations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSHA")
precludes implying a private right of action 50 and that (2) a state
court would not rely on OSHA as a source of the standard of care
in a tort suit.5 1 If my analysis is correct, the first holding implies
adoption of the public interest view of legislation and the second
implies its rejection. 2
E.

The Construction of Criminal Statutes

Although the canons of statutory construction have received
well-merited criticism on grounds of fatuity and inconsistency,5 3
the "rule of lenity," under which courts construe criminal statutes more narrowly than those that provide only civil remedies,
usually escapes criticism as long as unnatural constructions are
avoided. Economic analysis suggests the following explanation.
Every statute overdeters to a certain extent, because its bounds are
uncertain and fear of inadvertent liability causes some people to
steer well clear of those bounds. The harsher the sanctions for violation, the greater the overdeterrence and the resulting costs in socially beneficial conduct forgone. Overdeterrence can be reduced
by careful specification of the statutory limits. If a statute is intended to be specific, courts should not construe it broadly.
This assumes that the legislature is sensitive to the costs of
overdeterrence-in other words, that it wants considerations of efficiency to guide judicial interpretation of its product. Not all criminal statutes can be interpreted in this light, but I assume most can
See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
10 Otto v. Specialties, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 1240, 1242-43 (N.D. Miss. 1974).
51Id. at 1244-45 (applying Mississippi law).
52 For a very different view of why courts apply statutory norms in common law adjudi48
4-

cation, stressing moral factors, see Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Economic
Theory of Law, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1015, 1016-27 (1978).
'3 For good treatments, see Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurterand the Reading of Statutes, in FELIx FRANKFURTER: THE JUDGE 30 (W. Mendelson ed. 1964), reprinted in H.
FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS
APPEALS 521 (1960).

196 (1967); K.

LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING

5 See, e.g., Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 112 (1979); United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95-96 (1820); Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal
Statutes, 48 HARv. L. REv. 748 (1935).
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be. If this assumption is true, then the courts' inability to distinguish on a statute-by-statute basis between public interest and interest group motivations for legislation implies that they should
treat all criminal statutes as public interest statutes and assume
that the legislature would want the statute interpreted narrowly.
A statute can underdeter as well as it can overdeter, and if
overdeterrence is the characteristic vice of broad construction, underdeterrence is the characteristic vice of narrow construction. But
the costs are not symmetrical. The harsher the sanction for a violation of law, the higher the cost-justified level of care in drafting.
Careful drafting avoids both underdeterrence and overdeterrence.
If the legislature can be assumed to draft criminal statutes more
carefully than civil statutes, then courts should construe criminal
statutes more narrowly than they construe civil statutes-and they
do.
Not all criminal sanctions are more severe than civil sanctions.
The antitrust laws illustrate this point. The maximum criminal
fine that can be imposed on a corporation for violating the Sher56
man Act is one million dollars,5 5 but trebling of civil damages
makes two-thirds of every private damages judgment for violation
of the Sherman Act penal. Thus there is no limit to the amount a
corporation might be forced to pay in a civil suit under the Sherman Act. The question of when civil penalties should be equated
with criminal sanctions and therefore be governed by stricter procedural safeguards is beyond the scope of the present inquiry. 5
But I do think that a statute that provides for civil penalties comparable in severity to typical criminal sanctions should be interpreted as narrowly as a criminal statute covering the same subject
matter. In antitrust cases, therefore, treble damages should be
awarded only where there would be criminal liability. I do not contend that the rule of narrow construction that I am proposing for
statutes that impose civil penalties is constitutionally required;
thus the suggested reform would require amending the antitrust
" 15

U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976).
"' Id. § 15.
" The Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area approaches complete deference to
congressional labeling. See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-51 (1980) (deference to
congressional decision that penalty under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act was
civil); Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442,
449-50 (1977) (deference to congressional decision that OSHA administrative proceedings
are not subject to the seventh amendment). See generally Charney, The Need for Constitutional Protections for Defendants in Civil Penalty Cases, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 478 (1974).
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laws, which now entitle any plaintiff who proves actual damages to
a trebling of them.
III.
A.

IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

Strict or Loose?

There is great debate today, as always, over how strictly constitutional provisions should be construed. I do not want to enter
the debate; 8 it is enough for my purposes to observe that virtually
everyone who writes on the question thinks that constitutional
provisions should not be construed as strictly as statutory provisions. I want to consider whether there are any economic reasons
supporting looser construction of constitutional provisions, without
worrying how much looser that construction is or should be.
I once thought the most powerful reason for looser construction of constitutional provisions was the cost of amending the Constitution relative to that of amending a statute. But this reasoning
is superficial; it merely invites the courts to amend the Constitution through loose construction. There is a better reason for construing the Constitution less strictly than statutes. The Framers
made it difficult to amend the Constitution because an easy
amendment policy would create instability in the nation's fundamental institutions. 59 But this does not mean they necessarily rejected liberal construction of constitutional provisions by the
courts (or would have done so if the question had been put to
them), for construction is unlikely to change the nature of the instrument as radically as amendment. Text and history provide
some check on construction (though in some eras precious little),
but none at all on amendment. This argument resembles my earlier view but is more persuasive because it derives not from the
Constitution's amendment clause but from a contrast between
what courts can do to an instrument through construction and
what a constitutional convention or a legislature can do through
amendment.
There is another reason for construing the Constitution less
strictly than statutes, though if this reason is operative the term
88 I do point the reader to two excellent and brief defenses of the tradition of judicial
self-restraint that are easily overlooked: P. DEVLIN, The Judge as Lawmaker, in THE JUDGE
1 (1979); L. HAND, How Far is a Judge Free in Rendering a Decision, in THE SPIRIT OF
LIBERTY 103 (I. Dilliard 3d ed. 1960).
9 See Dellinger, The Recurring Question of the "Limited" ConstitutionalConvention,

88

YALE

L.J. 1623, 1625 (1979).
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"loose" may be a misnomer. It is extraordinarily difficult to ascertain the intent of a document drafted two hundred years ago or, as
in the case of the fourteenth amendment, even one hundred years
ago. The cultural, political, and even linguistic setting is so altered
that reconstructing the intent behind the constitutional provisions
becomes a task of historical research. Judges do not have the time
or the training to do such difficult research; even when it is done
by competent legal historians it often yields highly uncertain results. If the intended meaning of a provision is difficult to recover
because of the passage of time, any construction of the provision
(except one that denies it any contemporary application at all) will
seem "loose" to opponents of that construction. It would be more
accurate to say that uncertainty over intended meaning increases
the variance of defensible interpretations around the (unascertainable) true meaning, for the court is as likely to undershoot as to
overshoot the mark.
Although we tend to think of the problem of unrecoverable
meaning as one peculiarly of constitutional interpretation, the
point is not limited to the Constitution. It applies to any very old
statute, such as the Sherman Act, 0 enacted in 1890 and not significantly amended since. There is as much warrant for departing
from the literal meaning of the Sherman Act as for departing from
the literal meaning of the fourteenth amendment.
If historical research should yield an unambiguous answer regarding the meaning of a particular constitutional provision, the
question would arise whether a court interpreting the provision today should feel bound by the historical understanding. If, but only
if, a contrary meaning is well established in precedent, I would answer "no." Legal principles that have been well settled for a century or more should not exist at the sufferance of historians, so
that a piece of brilliant historiography could change the public policy of the nation at a stroke. This conclusion, related to the policies that underlie stare decisis and statutes of limitations, does not
necessarily flout the intent of the Framers. They were practical
men rather than ideologues; they probably would not have wanted
the country to pay a big price for correcting mistakes in interpretation many years after such mistakes had been made and after the
country had adapted to them.
The disruption of established institutions is a less acute prob-

60

Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976)).
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lem in the case of old statutes. If legislative history of the Sherman
Act turned up conclusively proving that the Act was intended to
protect competitors rather than consumers, so that ninety years of
judicial construction were unsound, Congress could restore the judicial interpretation with the stroke of a pen. It could not do the
same thing if the American Historical Society certified that the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment had not been intended to place any substantive limitations on state action.
I am advocating a more limited role for historical research
with regard to constitutional provisions that have a long-settled
construction than with regard to equally old statutes, but the argument also reinforces in a different way the case for, looser construction of constitutional than of statutory provisions. If constitutional
provisions are characteristically old and hence difficult to interpret, constitutional adjudication is inescapably more difficult than
statutory construction because the courts lack the usual assistance
of an intelligible text and a meaningful legislative history. Thus we
can expect the incidence of error in constitutional adjudication to
be higher than in statutory adjudication. We must therefore decide
which kind of error is more costly: the erroneous denial of the legislative will expressed in a statute (or in administrative or executive action thereunder) invalidated on constitutional grounds, or
the erroneous denial of a constitutional right. I believe that the
erroneous invalidation of a statute is generally more costly, especially if interest group legislation is only a fraction of all legislation. It must generally be better to thwart the desires of a small
group seeking to get from the courts what, by definition, it was
unable to get from the political branches than to thwart the will of
the majority, even if not every statute embodies the will of the
majority.
Because I am speaking only of cases where the meaning of the
Constitution is unclear, my conclusion does not place the minority
at the mercy of the majority and thereby deny the very concept of
a constitutional right. If someone has a clear constitutional right, it
must be enforced. But if a court cannot honestly determine
whether such a right exists, the right should be denied; doubts
should be resolved against the claimant."1
This conclusion may hold even if most statutes are assumed to
be the product of interest group pressures. Such legislation reflects
61This was urged in Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARv. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893).
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and expresses the dominant power in the community, and it is the
counsel of prudence for courts to yield to the dominant power
when to do so does not deny a clear constitutional right. Prudence-call it, if you will, timidity in the face of superior power-is
an acceptable tie-breaker where, by hypothesis, courts' interpretive
tools yield no clear answer to a claim of constitutional right.6 2
In short, all other arguments aside, the utilitarian notions that
underlie most versions of welfare economics, coupled with considerations of political prudence frankly imported from outside economics, indicate that, in general, constitutional rights should be
narrowly construed but constitutional powers broadly construed.
The qualification "in general" is important, though, because if the
meaning of a constitutional provision is clear, the problem of construction does not arise.
B.

Rationality Review

I have explained elsewhere why I think the interest group theory of legislation shows the fallacy of invalidating legislation on the
ground that it is not rationally related to a proper legislative purpose. Because no one seems to think it improper for interest
groups to influence the legislative process, it cannot be right to invalidate legislation just because it was procured by an interest
group. Yet that would be the effect of rationality review if it were
taken seriously and applied neutrally, for legislation passed on behalf of an interest group typically will flunk any test of rationality
other than pure self-interest. It is a different matter if such legislation infringes people's express constitutional rights. But that is not
the issue where legislation is invalidated merely as irrational, for
there is no express constitutional right not to be disadvantaged by
the characteristic operation of the political process.
Responding to the problem of interest groups that use voter
ignorance to subvert the ideal operation of the democratic system, 4 Professor Gerald Gunther has proposed that legislation not
reasonably related to the legislators' stated end be held to violate
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.6 5 The

62

This was Holmes's position. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.

See R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 495-96; Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB.
L. REV. 197 (1976). For a criticism of my analysis, see Michelman, Politics and Values or
What's Really Wrong with Rationality Review?, 13 CREIGHTON L. REv. 487, 503-06 (1979).
See supra p. 273.
63 Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doc-
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legislature would be forced to state its actual purpose clearly and
so give more information to the electorate. Gunther's proposal is
appealing; and though, as he is well aware, it cannot be derived
from the text, history, or purpose of the fourteenth amendment,
perhaps it is too late in the day to return to the original understanding of the amendment. I have a different point to make: that
if my analysis is correct, Gunther's proposal may be redundant. To
repeat an earlier point,6 6 if the judiciary is constrained to interpret
statutes in accordance with their stated rather than true ends, the
ability of interest groups to manipulate an ignorant electorate is
automatically limited. No doubt there are cases where the stated
objective is so incongruous compared with the actual statutory directive (for example, requiring the licensing of shoe salesmen to
limit the spread of athlete's foot) that Gunther's principle would
require invalidating the legislation, whereas mere interpretation
would allow attainment of the interest group's desires. But a case
so transparent to a court may also be transparent to the electorate
or its representatives, while if the lack of reasonable connection
between means and stated end is not so transparent, the judges are
apt to be fooled along with the voters. No doubt there is a middle
ground of cases that would be affected by his proposal; the question is how large it would be-it may be small.
C.

Strict Scrutiny

In recent years the Supreme Court has declared that statutes
infringing "fundamental rights" are valid only if they survive
"strict scrutiny" of the justifications offered for them. There can
be no objection to this standard-except perhaps that it is too
lax 6 8 -if the fundamental right in question has firm constitutional
roots, as does, for example, the right not to be discriminated
against on racial grounds. But when the concept of fundamental
rights is expanded to take in a host of interests with no specific
constitutional provenance, and when, moreover, most of those interests involve sex or its consequences,6 the practical effect of the
trine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 2021, 23 (1972).
" See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
" In addition to the cases cited infra note 69, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969) (right to travel); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to

vote).
See R. POSNER, supra note 25, at 375-76.
19 See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (right of father with prior child
88
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strict scrutiny standard is to prevent serious consideration of any
possible justifications for the challenged statute.
Laws regulating sex fall into the class of statutes that I call
"public sentiment" statutes, 70 for they rest on public feeling rather
than on a utilitarian or economic calculus. A strict scrutiny standard asks the state to furnish clear and convincing reasons for the
statute; and whatever may be the status of utilitarianism among
contemporary philosophers, the reasons that strike judges as clear
and convincing are usually utilitarian reasons.7 1 To show that a
statute confers a great enough benefit to justify infringing a "fundamental" right requires a showing that the statute promotes a
compelling state interest, which in practice means the greatest
good of the greatest number. But it is the nature of public sentiment statutes that they are not susceptible of utilitarian justification-and most of the fundamental rights created by the Supreme
imposed by
Court in recent years are rights against constraints
72
public sentiment statutes on personal behavior.
Indeed, despite all the efforts to ground the fundamental
rights approach in antiutilitarian thought, it is difficult to resist
the impression that the approach is utilitarianism run wild. Courts
perceive the claims of the woman seeking an abortion or of the
teen-aged girl seeking the joys of sex unthreatened by pregnancy
as claims to happiness not offset by any happiness claim on the
other side, with the result that the statutes restricting abortions or
denying teenagers access to contraceptives flunk an elementary
Benthamite test. So strong is the utilitarian hold over the judicial
imagination that even in an area not governed by a strict scrutiny
standard-sex discrimination 7s-the Court prefers a specious utilitarian justification to a frank acknowledgment that a challenged
statute rests on public sentiment. For example, in the recent

support obligations to marry without court approval); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431
U.S. 678 (1977) (distribution of contraceptives to minors under 16); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973) (right to abortion); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972)
(right of dependent, unacknowledged, illegitimate child to recover under worker's compensation law for death of father); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (right of unwed father
to child custody); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (use of contraceptives by unmarried people); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (right to private possession of obscene
material); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (use of contraceptives by married
people).
70 See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
71 For a recent example, see Kaplan, Book Review, 95 HARv. L. Rav. 528, 533 (1981).
7' See cases cited supra note 69.
73 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (intermediate scrutiny).
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Michael M. case,7 4 where a young man challenged the constitutionality of his conviction for statutory rape on the ground that the
statute did not punish females, the Court upheld the conviction on
unconvincing deterrent grounds.7 5 The statutory distinction obviously rested on conventional views regarding the male and female
roles in sexual activity rather than on any view that excusing females from liability would have a greater deterrent effect than
would making them liable as well as males.
It may seem odd for me to be criticizing the use of a utilitarian
calculus to guide constitutional adjudication. But whether or not
the fourteenth amendment adopts the felicific calculus, there is a
pitfall in using the calculus where only the costs of regulation, and
not its benefits, can be measured.76 The costs of statutes that limit
personal freedom are patent, whether or not they can actually be
quantified; the benefits are unmeasurable, yet they may still exceed the costs.
D. Delegation
There has been renewed interest lately in the doctrine of
nondelegation, which holds that the powers granted to the separate
branches of government in the Constitution are not delegable to
other branches.7 7 If there is such a principle, it has characteristically been honored in the breach, notably in the creation of independent administrative agencies. These agencies exercise legislative authority without being part of Congress; judicial authority,
without complying with the requirements of article III; and executive authority, without being subordinate to the executive.7 8 But I
think there is an economic argument, though not necessarily a con7 Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
Id. at 469-73 (statute justified by legitimate state interest in preventing teenage
pregnancy).
7' This is a frequent criticism of cost-benefit analysis in environmental regulation. See,

e.g., Anderson, The National Environmental Policy Act, in

FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

301-03 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974); Hammond, Convention and Limitation in Benefit-Cost Analysis, 6 NAT. RESOURCES J. 195, 203-10 (1966).
7 See, e.g., Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 672-76
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM 92-126 (2d ed. 1979);
Gewirtz, The Courts, Congress, and Executive Policy-Making: Notes on Three Doctrines,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1976, at 46, 49-65; Scalia, Back to Basics: Making Law
Without Making Rules, REG., July/Aug. 1981, at 25.
78. The President can neither remove members of independent agencies before their
terms expire nor nullify their actions. See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958);
Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
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clusive one, to be made for the constitutionality of the independent agency. Like the argument for construing criminal statutes
more narrowly than civil statutes, 79 it depends on a legislative process analysis rather than on a legislative substance analysis.
It is a peculiarity of legislatures committed to decision by majority vote that they cannot easily be enlarged to meet a greater
demand for their output,80 as an ordinary business enterprise or
government department can be. Adding members to a legislature
increases the costs of securing majority agreement and does so at
an increasing rate. The formula for the number of separate communication links required to connect all members of a group of n
members, n(n-1)/2, will give us a crude idea of the transaction
costs involved in legislative production. If the legislature has 100
members, the number of separate links required for a majority is
1275. If the number of legislators is raised to 200, the number of
required links rises to 5050-almost a four-fold increase, although
the number of legislators has only doubled. In short, an expanding
legislature encounters severe diseconomies of scale.
This point supplies a practical justification for the delegation
of legislative authority to independent agencies. Parallel arguments
are available to justify delegation to the agencies of judicial and
executive power as well. There must be one Supreme Court, and it
would lose its judicial character if its membership were increased
very much, as it might have to be if the lower federal courts exercised the judicial power that has instead been vested (subject to
only limited review) in the agencies. Expansion of the executive
through a proliferation of subordinate officers reduces popular control of the executive branch, because the span of control of the
only elected executive official, the President, is limited.
Accepting this justification is not tantamount to endorsing judicial amendment of the Constitution. There is no explicit principle of nondelegation in the Constitution. The Framers could not
have foreseen the enormous growth of the nation and presumably
did not want to limit the adaptability of the Constitution to remote future conditions, except insofar as they placed explicit limitations on such adaptation. Arguing for constitutional adaptability
is different from asserting that courts are free to amend the Con7' See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
80 1 am speaking of the legislature's legislative output. Legislators have other functions

besides the enactment of statutes, and these functions are unaffected by my analysis because they do not depend on majority agreement.
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stitution by interpretation just because the Framers deliberately
made amendment by any other route very difficult-a proposition
that cannot withstand casual, let alone strict, scrutiny.
But if the suggested interpretation is not usurpative, it may
still be wrong. The independent agency, with its combination of
legislative, judicial, and executive .powers, seems to violate the
principle, fundamental in the Constitution's text and history, of
the separation of powers. Specifically, the growth of the independent agency may well have placed more power in the hands of the
legislature relative to the other branches than the Framers contemplated. Against this consideraton must be set the unreality of expecting the Supreme Court to attempt at this late date to dismantle the administrative state. In these equivocal circumstances, the
economic argument outlined above should carry weight.
IV.

FITTING THE COURTS INTO THE THEORY

The economic theory of legislative and constitutional interpretation assumes that courts are simply agents of the enacting body.
As Professor William Landes and I have argued elsewhere, 81 this
assumption is not inconsistent with the tradition of judicial independence from political control, for independence is a precondition
of the courts acting as agents of the enacting, rather than the current, legislature. Of course, independence from current political
pressures does not guarantee that the courts will try to follow the
will of the statutory or constitutional draftsmen rather than their
own views of proper policy. The discredited canon of statutory
construction that statutes in derogation of the common law are to
be narrowly construed8 2 is an example of judicial independence
asserted to thwart the will of the enacting legislature, and my
discussion of constitutional interpretation has revealed many discrepancies between contemporary judicial practice and what the
economic theory of constitutional interpretation implies would be
the correct practice. To complicate the issue further, courts seeking guidance on the meaning of a statute are limited to the text
itself and the published legislative history, and this limitation, as
we have seen, reduces the legislature's practical ability to get the
courts, however willing they may be, to work its will.
81 See Landes & Posner, supra note 2.
82 See, e.g., Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383 (1908).

Though discredited, the principle is not dead. See, e.g., 3 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 61 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1974).
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Despite all this, a comparison of the analyses in this article of
statutory and constitutional interpretation reveals a greater congruence of the former than of the latter with the economic theory
of legislation. A possible reason for this difference is that if courts
misinterpret a statute, the legislature can nullify their misinterpretation rather easily through an amending statute. Courts therefore
have little to gain by setting their will against the legislature's.
Thus a theory that correctly identifies the forces operating on the
legislature should also predict the behavior of the courts in interpreting legislation. Courts have much more leeway in interpreting
the Constitution, not only because the Constitution is so costly to
amend, but also because its antiquity makes it unlikely that the
same political forces that procured its enactment are still around
to nullify departures from it.
By the same token we would expect, and we find, at least if
the antitrust laws are a representative example, less responsible judicial interpretation of old than of recent statutes. This is not only
because of the inherently greater difficulty of accurately interpreting the older laws; it also reflects the greater independence from
legislative retribution that courts enjoy when they are interpreting
very old statutes.

